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ROBERT

M. JARVIS*

The Space Shuttle Challenger and the
Future Law of Outer Space Rescues
I. Introduction
The dark side of space exploration, hidden for years behind silver clouds
and golden accomplishments, took center stage on the morning of January
28, 1986. On that unseasonably cold day in Florida, seven astronauts lost
their lives when the United States space shuttle Challenger exploded just
seventy-three seconds into the flight. 1 For the United States, it was the worst
space tragedy since the founding of the American space program in the late
1950s. 2 For the world, it signalled that although mankind has progressed
far
3
in its attempt to master space, much about space remains unknown.
*B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M. New York University. Member of the New York and California Bars. The author practices maritime law with
the firm of Baker & McKenzie in New York City. The assistance of Geoffrey L. Denempont, a
member of the class of 1985 of the University of Arizona College of Law, is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See Broad, The Shuttle Explodes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at Al, col. 5; Magnuson,
"They slipped the surly bonds of earth to touch the face of God," TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 24
[hereinafter cited as Magnuson]; Marbach, What Went Wrong? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at
32.
2. Prior to Challenger, the American space program had had few serious mishaps. In the
wake of Challenger, however, it was widely agreed that it had only been a matter of time before
a major accident would befall NASA. Senator John Glenn, the first American to orbit the
earth, said, "I guess we always knew there would be a day like this. This is a day we hoped to
push back forever." Roberts, CongressionalLeaders to Hold Extensive Hearings Into Cause,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at A9, col. 1. Former astronaut Jack Lousma, pilot of the space
shuttle Columbia, said, "Since NASA made it look so easy, people thought it could never
happen. Those of us close to the program thought it could happen a whole lot sooner. We're
glad it was postponed this long." Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at 21. Indeed,
officials of NASA were shocked by the Challenger disaster. See Reinhold, At Mission Control,
Silence and Grief Fill a Day of HorrorLong Dreaded, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,1986, at A8, col. 1.
3. United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, in a letter to President
Reagan, said the international community was saddened and wrote, "Truly the entire world
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Before the Challenger disaster, events in outer space over-the last few
months had been of a happier type, focussing the world's attention on
mankind's rapidly expanding technical mastery 4 over outer space. In particular, man's increasing ability to enter and return to space on a regular
basis,5 the successful salvaging of two disabled satellites, 6 and the inclusion
will grieve this tragic loss of life incurred in the advancement of the frontiers of human
knowledge." Norman, From Abroad, Messages of Sadness and Support, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
1986, at A10, col. 2.
4. Even as man was increasing his technical mastery over space, however, his legal mastery
of the subject was falling behind. As with so many other new fields of endeavor, the law had
tended to react to events rather than to anticipate and prepare for changes. While part of the
reason for this was the fact that outer space exploration had been treated as both a military and
politcal issue, part of the reason lay in the fact that law schools and bar associations had been
slow to offer forums in which to discuss space law issues. This omission was beginning to be
corrected, as more and more attention was being given to the field. A systematic approach to
the study of legal issues in space had begun at the Hastings College of Law. Under a joint
venture called the NASA/Hastings Research Project, faculty and students at Hastings are
engaged in a number of research projects, including: the impact of strikes by civilian employees
on the NASA Kennedy Space Center; an analysis of the dispute resolution procedures contained in the Space Laboratory Agreement of August 14, 1973; the utility of the concept of
survival homicide during space flights; and the rights of disabled persons in space. The
NASA/Hastings Research Project is further discussed in Sloup, Determinationof Applicable
Law to Living and Working in Outer Space: The Municipal Law Connection and the NASA/
HastingsResearch Project, 14 LINCOLN L. REv. 43 (1984). For a general discussion of the role of
law schools in the development of space law, see Robinson, Legal Educationand PrivateSector
Initiativesin Space Exploitation, 2 WHITE'S INN CHRON. 19 (1984). Robinson has gone so far as
to suggest that whether the development of outer space will be a source of pride or shame for
mankind rests heavily with the legal profession: "Attorneys will, in large part, have the critical
responsibility of inculcating private space industries with universally acceptable values for how
humankind moves into and exploits space, and not just that it does so on the basis of available
technology." Id. at 23. See also Robinson, Space Lawyering: An UnusualBusiness, 54 FLA. B.J.
58 (1980).
5. Once only a dream, regular space travel had started to become a reality because of trips
such as Challenger. President Jimmy Carter once remarked that the space shuttle represented a
new era in the development of outer space exploration. Press, U.S. Space Policy-A
Framework for the 1980's, 35 ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS 34 (1979). The shuttle is a
reusable launch vehicle which can deploy satellites, undertake experiments and retrieve
payloads. It can carry up to 65,000 pounds of cargo in its 60' x 15' cargo bay. An overview of
the shuttle and its commercial use is contained in Hosenball, The Space Shuttle in Perspective, 9
J.SPACE L. 69 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hosenball]. See also J. GREY, ENTERPRISE: THE USE OF
THE SHUTTLE INOUR FUTURE SPACE PROGRAMS (1979). In the wake of Challenger, however, the
shuttle program was suspended indefinitely. Church, Puttingthe Futureon Hold, TIME, Feb. 10,
1986, at 38. Although in the past suspensions after a mishap have lasted up to twenty months
and caused some to question whether space exploration should be continued, there was no
immediate suggestion that the shuttle program ought to be abandoned. See Foley, The Public's
View, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at 37.
6. In 1984, the first successful salvage of commercial satellites was accomplished by NASA in
connection with the owners and manufacturer of the satellites. See infra notes 70-75 and
accompanying text. More recently, in August 1985, NASA completed a successful salvage of a
Navy satellite in what has been hailed as a "most remarkable salvage mission." See O'Toole,
Spacewalkers Send Repaired Navy Satellite Spinning On Its Way, Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 1985, at
A3. See also Cummings, Space Shuttle Lands Safely After 'Near-Perfect' Mission, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 4, 1985, at A14, col. 1.
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of civilians among spaceship crews, 7 had heralded the rapid approach of a
day when regular space travel and activity would become routine. 8 In the
wake of Challenger, however, the world was forced to reassess the advantages of manned space travel. 9

The rescue effort which followed was not the first of its kind,'0 nor was it
likely to be the last." It was, however, one of the few to involve staff
working on the ground, as opposed to just the crew.' 2 Because the rescue
effort was aimed at a mission and a crew of a single nation and was
conducted in the territory of that nation, potentially difficult questions
concerning jurisdiction and sovereignty did not arise. But the possibility that

7. After months of extensive interviews and testing, NASA announced on July 19, 1985 that
it had selected Sharon Christa McAuliffe, 36, a social studies teacher from Concord, N.H., to
serve as the first civilian crew member aboard a space shuttle mission. See Wilford, Teacher is
Picked for Shuttle Trip, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1985, at 28, col. 1. Ms. McAuliffe, who was
selected from among 11,000 applicants, was one of the seven astronauts aboard the Challenger.
Her death was particularly mourned, for she had been the first "ordinary citizen" in space and
she had dedicated her flight to other ordinary citizens. See McAuliffe's Goal: 'Humanize
Technology of the Space Age,' N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at A6, col. 1; Marquand, McAuliffe
Dedicates Her Shuttle Flight to 'Common Man.' Christian Sci. Monitor, July 22, 1985, at 1. A
few months prior to Ms. McAuliffe's selection, Senator Jake Garn of Utah became the first
member of Congress to accompany the crew of the space shuttle. See O'Toole, Senator, 6
Astronauts Aloft at Last; Much Delayed Space Flight Was Almost Postponed Again, Wash.
Post, Apr. 12, 1985, at Al; Browne, Man in the News; Senator Who Aims High: Edwin Jacob
Garn, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1985, at 8, col. 4; Taylor, Shuttle Blasts Senator into Space, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 13, 1985, at 1.
8. As noted by one observer, "Americans had soared into space 55 times over 25 years, and
...[a]n age when most anyone, given a few months' training, could go along for a safe ride
seemed imminent." Magnuson, supra note 1, at 24.
9. Many people once again began to suggest that space flights should be unmanned. See
Begley, New Life for a Debate: To Man or Not to Man? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at 39. Tom
Wolfe, the author of THE RIGHT STUFF, compared a lift-off to sitting "on top of a Roman
candle," waiting to have an "engineer light the fuse." Wolfe, Everyman vs. Astropower,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at 40. As a result of Challenger, new interest also began to be shown
in such existing unmanned programs as the European Space Agency's Ariane satellite launcher
and the French-proposed Hermes project, an unmanned shuttle due to be in operation in the
mid-1990s. Rachid & Unsworth, Foreigners Still to Use US Shuttle, J. COM., Jan. 30, 1986, at
3A, cols. 2-3.
10. The United States Coast Guard and Navy, together with NASA, launched an intensive
air-and-sea search for Challenger immediately after the tragedy occurred. Clendinen, Search
by Air and Sea Yields No Signs of the Shuttle Crew, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at A5, col. 5. By
the time the search was called off, thirteen vessels, four planes and nine helicopters had
searched an area that had grown in size to 6,000 square miles. Friedrich, Lookingfor What Went
Wrong, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 36. A similar rescue operation was undertaken after the Cosmos
954 satellite failed and crashed in Canada. The story of the Cosmos 954 is recounted infra note
67.
11. Despite attempts to make space travel as safe as possible, mishaps of one sort or another
have continually plagued man's efforts. These previous problems are recounted infra note 60,
and make it a virtual certainty that there will be problems in the future.
12. Although earlier manned missions had run into trouble, such incidents rarely provided
an opportunity for assistance by Mission Control or rescue teams waiting on the ground. See
infra note 60.
SPRING 1986
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future space rescue operations might involve crews whose members are of
many different nationalities, and might be conducted in the territory of third
countries, raises the questions of what law would apply in such a situation
and which courts would be competent to decide disputes arising from such

rescues. Regrettably, the answer is a confused one because, despite the fact
that seventeen years have passed since man took his first step on the moon,
13
the world is without a comprehensive set of laws regulating space activity.

This state of events has not come about for lack of trying. 14 Since before
the Apollo touched down on the moon's surface, many proposals have been

put forward for regulating the heavens and ensuring that their rich promise
is made the heritage of all peoples. 15 A number of these proposals, to a

13. It generally is acknowledged that the world officially entered the Space Age in October
1957, when the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik satellite. Shortly after Sputnik's launch,
Senator Kenneth B. Keating stated that, "a genuine international effort to define the rights of
all nations in space is one of the world's compelling needs. Anarchy in space could be more
dangerous than anarchy on Earth ... "Menter, CommercialParticipationin Space Activities, 9
J. SPACE L. 53, 65 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Menter]. Even before the advent of Sputnik,
however, the roots of outer space law were being nurtured in the garden of aviation law. See
Galloway, Perspectivesof Space Law, 9 J. SPACE L. 21 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Galloway].
14. See generally Corrigan, Outer Space Law-A Brief Review: How to Go into Outer
Space-Legally, 28 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 422 (1985). For a short but useful article which provides
an overview of the status of outer space law through 1980, see Lachs, Some Reflections on the
State of the Law of Outer Space, 9 J. SPACE L. 3 (1981). For a pre-Challenger article which
predicted the amount of progress which outer space law is likely to make by the end of this
decade, see Doyle, Significant Developments in Space Law: A Projectionfor the Next Decade, 9
J. SPACE L. 105 (1981).

15. The idea that outer space is the common heritage of mankind has, from time to time,
been objected to quite strenuously. As has been pointed out by a commentator, passage of an
agreement regulating activities on the Moon was held up for years by the Soviet Union, which
objected to the inclusion in the preamble of a statement that the Moon's resources were the
common heritage of mankind. Lay, Space Law: A New Proposal, 8 J. SPACE L. 41, 43 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Lay]. See also Christol, The Common Heritageof Mankind Provision in the
1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14
INT'L LAW. 429 (1980). During this period, a similar debate was taking place with respect to the
mineral resources of the oceans, which, because of the advent of new technologies, were
starting to become extremely important. See Christy, PropertyRights in the World Ocean. 15
NAT. RESOURCES J. 695 (1975). This time, however, opposition to characterizing these resources as belonging to all mankind came from the United States. When the United States
found that it could not muster sufficient support for its position, it (along with only Israel,
Turkey and Venezuela) voted against the 1982 Law of the Sea treaty, which had taken ten years
to draft. The treaty can be found at U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, 7 October 1982, reprintedin
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1261 (1982). The reason why the United States objected to the treaty was due
to the fact that a number of American companies who possessed the technology to mine the
seabed were afraid that they would not receive adequate compensation for their efforts under
the treaty. To protect these companies, the United States unilaterally enacted the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (Supp. 1985). The Act provides for
licensing U.S. citizens to engage in commercial seabed mining outside areas of national
jurisdiction. For an article which draws parallels between the debates over the resources of the
sea and the resources of space, see Nesgos, The ProposedInternationalSea-Bed Authority as a
Model for the Future Outer Space InternationalRegime, 5 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 549 (1980).
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greater or lesser extent, have been adopted by the nations of the world. 1 6 In
addition, the legal profession, when called upon to respond to a particular
situation, has acted swiftly and creatively. 17 Despite these beginnings,
however, it is clear that there is a large body of law which is still waiting to be
written. How this void is filled during the remainder of this century will
determine the course of the development and use of outer space well into the
next century.
One reason for the gap in space law is the seeming lack of precedents. It
has been written, for example, that, "In their search to duplicate on earth
the legal disputes that may erupt in a spacecraft, astrolawyers can't turn to
West's Annotated U.S. Code or Shepard's Citations."' 8 A number of com-

mentators have proposed that the answer to the lack of a jurisprudence of
outer space lies in shaping existing earth law to meet the unique needs and
situations which are encountered in space.1 9 Some of these commentators
have suggested that the existing law which would be most helpful in resolving outer space legal issues is admiralty law. 2 °

This article is intended to advance the proposition that admiralty law
provides many useful precedents for resolving outer space disputes. Given
this thesis, the article's purpose is to demonstrate the applicability of admiralty to space law within the particular context of situations in which

spaceships and satellites must be rescued. Because, admiralty law has developed a highly refined law of salvage this article reviews the theoretical
underpinnings of that law and demonstrates how the law of salvage developed by admiralty courts could be used to resolve questions likely to arise
16. See generally Note, Common Heritage of Mankind: An Assessment, 14 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 509 (1982); Kopal, The Question of Defining Outer Space, 8 J. SPACE L. 154 (1980).
17. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
18. Zieman, Legal Vacuum: Lack of Law May Slow The Use of Outer Space By Private
Enterprise, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Zieman].
19. See, e.g., Costello, Spacedwelling Families:the ProjectedApplication of Family Law in
Artificial Space Living Environments, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Costello]; Cocca, The Advances in InternationalLaw Through the Law of Outer Space, 9 J.
SPACE L. 13 (1981); Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretationand the Implementation
of the Rules of InternationalSpace, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1981); Gorove, Energy
from Space: An Imperativefor InternationalCooperation, 9 J. SPACE L. 41 (1981); Vereshchetin, InternationalSpace Law and Domestic Law: Problems of Interrelations,9 J. SPACE L. 31
(1981).
20. See, e.g., DeSaussure, Toward a Law for Space Transport, The Maritime Analogy, 14
LINCOLN L. REV. 1 (1983); Glazer, The Maritime Analogy in Outer Space, 1 WHITE'S INN
CHRON. 16 (1983); Lloyd, Submarinersand Spacefarers-A Suggested Analogy, 1 WHITE'S INN
CHRON. 47 (1983); DeSaussure, Astronauts and Seamen-A Legal Comparison, 10 J. SPACE L.
165 (1982); Glazer, Seafaring and Spacefaring with the First Company Law (White's Inn)
CaliforniaNaval Militia,4 GLENDALE L. REV. 148 (1980). The first commentator to suggest that
the legal problems of outer space could be resolved by analogies to maritime law appears to
have been the Czech jurist Vladimir Mandl. See In re White's Inn, 2 WHITE'S INN CHRON. 13, 16
(1984). Mandl suggested the analogy in his classic work DAS WEITRAUM-RECHT EIN PROBLEM
DER RAUMFAHRT (1932).
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with respect to outer space rescue operations. While it is not suggested that
all of the problems which will be met as man travels deeper into space can be
resolved through resort to admiralty law, it is contended that admiralty
could provide a useful framework for many of the problems that will be
encountered.
The article will begin with a review of existing outer space law, 21 and
suggest that what law exists is, in general, either so broad or so narrow in
scope as to be unhelpful in most situations. 2 From there the article will
23
move into a discussion of outer space rescue operations which could occur, 24
the approaches which currently exist for dealing with such occurrences, 25
and how admiralty law could be brought to bear on such situations.
Finally, the article will conclude with a discussion of how admiralty law
could be incorporated by both courts and legislatures into future space law

precedents. 26
II. Existing Space Law
A.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

1. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Existing space law is a hodgepodge of international agreements and
national laws. The earliest international treaties were aimed at limiting the
military use of outer space, and were concluded during the years of the Cold
War. The most important of such treaties was the Treaty Banning Nuclear7
2
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.
Popularly known as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Moscow Test Ban
Treaty, and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it was done at Moscow in
the summer of 1963 and came into force for the United States on October 10,
1963 by means of a Presidential Proclamation issued by John F. Kennedy
following the advice and consent of the Senate. Since its promulgation, the
treaty has been adopted by one hundred ten countries, making it the most
successful of all the space treaties.28 The treaty requires parties "to prohibit,
to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in
the atmosphere; beyond its limits; or underwater ... or (b) in any other

21. See infra notes 27-56 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 44-49, 69-75 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 109-119 and 121 and accompanying text.
27. Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
28. No treaty regulating outer space which has been concluded since the Test Ban Treaty has
been agreed to by more than about eighty states. For a list of comparisons, see infra note 121.
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environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control
such explosion is conducted. . .

."

Besides these promises, states who

become bound by the treaty agree "to refrain from causing, encouraging, or
in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments
described. .. ."
Despite its good intentions, the treaty has been criticized as having several
glaring weaknesses. 29 First is that the treaty limits only the experimental use
of nuclear weapons. As President Kennedy explained in 1963, the treaty "in
no way limits the authority of the commander-in-chief to use nuclear
weapons for the defense of the United States . . . if a situation should
develop requiring such a grave decision." 30 Second is that there is no
provision in the treaty for the detection and control of nuclear weapons. The
seriousness of this defect has become increasingly clear over the past decade, as an increasing number of countries have either built nuclear weapons
or acquired the capability to build such weapons. Indeed, France and
Mainland China, which have nuclear weapons, have never become
signatories. 31 A final problem with the treaty is that its application can be
and has been limited. In theory, the treaty prohibits signatories from with-

drawing from the treaty unless extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the treaty have occurred which jeopardize the supreme interests of
the withdrawing state. 32 In practice, however, there are no penalties if a
party decides to withdraw. Moreover, states have limited the application of
the treaty when it has suited their immediate purposes. When the Soviet

29. For general discussions of the Test Ban Treaty, see Schray, Scientists and the Test Ban, 75
YALE L. J. 1340 (1966); Schweib, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and InternationalLaw, 58 AM. J.
INT'L L. 642 (1964).
30. A Primeron Space Law: Part I-The Treaties, 1 AIR AND SPACE LAW 25, 25 (1984).
31. For a general discussion of France's position, see D'Amato, Legal Aspects of the French
Nuclear Tests, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 66 (1967). Despite years of international opposition and
criticism, France continues to test nuclear weapons in the earth's atmosphere. French leaders
have consistently maintained that such tests are safe. See e.g., MitterrandInvites 14 Nations to
Judge A-Test Site's Safety, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1985, at A4, col. 3. France's credibility with
regards to nuclear testing suffered permanent damage, however, when it was admitted that
French agents had sabotaged the Rainbow Warrior, an anti-nuclear Greenpeace ship which had
sought to protest French nuclear testing in the Pacific. The vessel sank on July 10, 1985 after a
bomb aboard the ship was detonated. Lewis, Greenpeace Attack Linked to Key Atomic Tests,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, at A4, col. 3; Bernstein, Defense Minister Said to Order Ship
'Neutralized', N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, at A4, col. 3. When French Prime Minister Laurent
Fabius refused to reveal the identities of the operatives who had carried out the sabotage
because they had merely been "following orders," lawyers for Klaus Barbie, the Gestapo chief
of Lyons during World War I, asked the French government to release Barbie because he too
had been following orders when he ordered 4,000 people put to death. Barbie Asks Release;
Refers to Greenpeace, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, at A4, col. 3.
32. Art. IV of the Treaty states that it is of "unlimited duration."
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Union's Cosmos 954 satellite broke up over Canadian territory in 1978, the
U.S.S.R. argued that the treaty did not apply despite the fact that the
Cosmos had a nuclear reactor aboard. 33
2. Outer Space Treaty

The next treaty of importance to space law is the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 34 Done at Washington, London and Moscow in 1967 in anticipation of the landing of men on
the moon, the United States became a party to the treaty on October 10,
1967. The Treaty is commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty or the
Exploration and Use Treaty. The treaty's origin can be traced back to a
resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
December 13, 1963. Passed as Resolution 1962 and known as the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, it, along with a number of other resolutions
adopted by the United Nations, formed the basis of the Outer Space Treaty
and was incorporated in the treaty's preamble.
Although the treaty contains twelve articles, it is divided substantively
into five areas: (a) exploration and use of outer space; (b) weapons in space;
(c) the treatment of astronauts; (d) state responsibility; and, (e) cooperation. The first area-exploration and use-establishes outer space as the
heritage of mankind. As such, the treaty rejects the notion of national
sovereignty, following the example of the Antarctic Treaty. 35 The second
category-weapons-prohibits the use of certain types of weapons in space.
In particular, the treaty makes it illegal "to place in orbit around the Earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner." 36 Despite this seemingly
33. For a further discussion of the Cosmos 954 incident, see infra note 67 and accompanying
text.
34. Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
35. Comparisons between outer space and the Antarctic have often been made, because
Antarctica in the 1950s, like outer space today, was man's final frontier. As is well known, the
international community came together and collectively renounced any intention of territorial
acquisition of Antarctica. The disclaimer was embodied in the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959,
12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,402 U.N.T.S. 71. The treaty came into force on June 23, 1961
when ratifications were deposited by all of the signatory states. Under the treaty, the signatories-the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Japan and the United Kingdom-have
agreed that Antarctica shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the
object of international discord. It has been suggested by some that the reason why the signing
states were persuaded to renounce claims of sovereignty had to do principally with the region's
harsh weather. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER AND N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMCAsEs AND MATERIALS 771 (2d ed. 1981).

36. See Art. IV of the Treaty.
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broad language, it would appear that so-called killer satellites (or "Star
Wars," as such weapons have come to be called 37) are not prohibited
because they are not weapons of mass destruction. 38 Another problem with
the treaty's provisions regarding weapons is that there is no express provi37. Concern over the possibility of Star Wars began to emerge in the 1970s, as both the
United States and the Soviet Union began to perfect anti-satellite systems (ASATs). See U.S.
Seeks to Curb Killer-Satellites, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1979, at 1, col. 4; New Killer Satellites
Make Sky-War Possible,N.Y. Times, June 11, 1978, at 3, col. 1. At the same time, the Soviets
asked that the Space Shuttle program be discontinued, because the Shuttle could be used, in
addition to its peaceful applications, to place military satellites into orbit. See Soviets Said to
Ask Space Shuttle Halt, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1979, at 6, col. 1. For an interesting article on the
efforts by the Soviet Union to develop a space shuttle program, see Forbrich, The Soviet Space
Shuttle Program,31 AIR UNIV. R. 55 (1980). The subject of Star Wars continues to be a divisive
issue in the 1980s, as the Reagan Administration pursues the development of killer satellites.
See Testing ASATAnd Moscow, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, at El, col. 3. On September 13,
1985 the United States Air Force successfully tested a prototype anti-satellite weapon against a
target in space, an out-of-service satellite which was travelling 290 miles above the Pacific
Ocean. See Keller, Air Force Missile Strikes Satellite in First U.S. Test, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1985, at 1, col. 6. The Air Force defended the test despite the filing of a lawsuit aimed at
blocking the test and protests that the test would jeopardize chances of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. ASAT
treaty. See Judge Won't Bar Test FiringAt Satellite, Expected Today, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13,
1985, at A8, col. 1; Campbell, "Star Wars" Foes Pressfor Boycott, Sept. 13,1985, at A8, col. 1;
Mohr, Official Defends Space-Weapon Test, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at A3, col. 1.
Although some had hoped that the holding of talks between President Reagan and Secretary
Gorbachev in November 1985 would result in an agreement to limit ASATs, that hope was
dashed when President Reagan announced two months before the summit that he intended to
stand by his decision to fund ASAT research. Weinraub, Reagan Rules Out Deal with Soviet On
Space Weapons, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,1985, at Al, col. 6. At the same time, the West German
parliament agreed to allow West German companies to participate in American ASAT research. Smith, Bonn Pact Is Seen Over 'Star Wars,' N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at A7, col. 1.
Former Vice President Mondale criticized President Reagan's position, and argued that the
United States could afford to halt ASAT research if the Soviet Union agreed to cuts in its
nuclear arsenal. Mondale Criticalof Space Weapons, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1985, at A28, col. 1.
President Reagan later explained that while he would continue ASAT funding, he intended to
make ASATs a key topic during his talks with Premier Gorbachev, and hoped to convince the
Soviet Union that further development by it of offensive nuclear weapons was pointless.
Weinraub, 'Star Wars' to Be Summit Focus, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1985, at A3, col. 1.
Frustrated by their inability to directly convince the United States to abandon ASAT research,
the Soviet Union took its case to the United Nations. See Gwertzman, Soviet Minister, At The
U.N., Pushes A 'Star Wars' Ban, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 6. At the same time, a
Congressional study concluded that attempts by the United States to develop an ASAT
program might increase rather than decrease the likelihood of global nuclear war. Mohr,
Antimissile Shield Held to Raise Risk of a Nuclear War, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, at Al, col.
4. In an attempt to counter the charges that its refusal to yield on Star Wars research was
unreasonable and dangerous, the Reagan administration launched its own public relations
campaign in which it charged that the Soviets had been engaged in Star Wars research of its own
since the 1960s. See Soviet Star Wars, TIME, Oct. 14, 1985, at 28. The subject of Star Wars is
taken up further in Hill, PermissibleScope of Military Activity in Outer Space, 24 A.F.L. REV.
157 (1984); Russell, Military Activities in Outer Space: Soviet Legal Views, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J.
153 (1984).
38. The primary purpose of the "killer satellites" which Star Wars relies on is not to attack
human populations or military targets on earth, but to disrupt and destabilize other satellites.
As such, the killer satellites do not themselves cause destruction in the usual military sense. For
a discussion of the lawfulness of killer satellites, see Meredith, The Legality of a HighTechnology Missile Defense System: The ABM and Outer Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418
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sion prohibiting the placing of stationary weapons on the moon or other
celestial bodies. Although military bases cannot be established, it is an open
question whether an unmanned but nevertheless armed weapon placed on
the moon would constitute a "military base" and thus be prohibited by the
treaty.
The third area of concern which the Outer Space Treaty takes up is the
treatment to be accorded astronauts. The treaty confers upon astronauts a
type of world citizenship, requiring each nation to recognize that astronauts
are "envoys of mankind." As earthly ambassadors representing the whole
of mankind, astronauts are to receive special protection from all nations. As
part of this special protection nations must advise other nations of any
phenomena which they discover which could interfere with the astronauts.39
The final topics taken up involve state responsibility and cooperation.
States who sign the treaty agree to be responsible for all consequences of
their acts which affect outer space. Such activities include governmental as
well as commercial acts. States are also required to retain jurisdiction over
registered space vehicles, despite their presence in outer space. Finally,
states pledge their mutual cooperation and assistance.
3. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts
Much has been written about the Outer Space Treaty since its promulgation nearly twenty years ago, and many criticisms have surfaced. In order to
address some of the more obvious problems with the treaty's provisions
regarding astronauts, an Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
was reached in the year following the Outer Space Treaty.40 The Agreement
now has seventy signatories. 4 ' Under the terms of the Agreement, states
(1984); James, The Legalities ofAntisatellites, 3 B.C. INT'L &COMP. L.J. 467 (1980); Zedalis &
Wade, Anti-satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 454
(1978).
39. See Article 5 of the treaty. The term "special protection" is problematic, since it is not
self-defining. As has been explained:
The Outer Space Treaty provides that all parties should regard astronauts as envoys of
mankind. What special protection this affords, apart from providing all possible assistance in
the event of accidents, distress, or emergency, is not clear. It is true they will not be treated as
diplomatic envoys with governmental immunity. If they are forced down in foreign territory
or on the high seas they will have a temporary diplomatic immunity until they are returned to
their own country. To what further protection are they entitled?
DeSaussure, Maritime and Space Law, Comparisonsand Contrasts (An Oceanic View of Space
Transport), 9 J. SPACE L. 93, 100 (1981) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as DeSaussure].
40. Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
41. For a review of the treaty, see Lee, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, I MANUAL ON SPACE L. 53
(1979); Riccio, Another Step for Mankind-the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the

Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 12 A.F. JAG L. REV. 142 (1970). For an early
article on the subject, see Hall, Comments on Salvage and Removal of Man-Made Objectsfrom
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must provide the launching state with any information that they have
regarding any spaceship in distress. If the distressed ship is within the
signatory's territory, the state must attempt to rescue it and, if successful,
must return it to the launching state.42 Similar rules apply with regard to
astronauts. 4
4. InternationalLiability for
Damage from Space Objects

Another treaty that can be of some guidance regarding space rescue issues
is the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects.4 4 The Convention entered into force for the United States on

October 9, 1973, 4 and more than fifty states are already members to the
Convention.46 The Convention provides that the launching state shall be

liable for damage caused by its space object absolutely in some cases, or for
its fault in others.4 7 A claims procedure is provided for in the Convention, 48

Outer Space, 33 J. AIR L. 288 (1967). Lee, at 53, notes that it took ten years, from 1959 until
1968, to arrive at a completed treaty. Although there were some disagreements between the
major space powers as to the approach which should be taken to rescue and return, the major
cause of the delay was a lack of general interest in completing the treaty. Id.
42. Under the treaty, any expenses borne by the state which recovers a space object and
returns it to the launching state are to be reimbursed by the launching state. This is made clear in
Article 5(5), which provides that, "[elxpenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and
return a space object or its component parts.., shall be borne by the launching authority." As
has been explained, however, the launching state will only be required to reimburse the
recovering state if it asked the recovering state to undertake the rescue. "Since the expenses
incurred by the Contracting Party must be borne by the launching state, a launching authority's
request for such recovery and return is a condition of this obligation." Dembling, Cosmos 954
and the Space Treaties, 6 J. SPACE L. 129, 132 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dembling].
43. See Hall, Rescue and Return ofAstronauts on Earth and in Outer Space, 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 197 (1969).
44. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 965.
45. The United States was the first country to propose such a convention. See USA:
Proposal: Liability for Space Vehicle Accidents, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.4 (1962).
46. The Convention is discussed in Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 346 (1980); Wilkins, Substantive Bases for Recovery for
Injuries Sustained by Private Individuals as a Result of Fallen Space Objects, 6 J. SPACE L. 161
(1978); Rajski, Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space ObjectsAn Important Step in the Development of the International Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS ON THE
SEVENTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 245 (1974).
47. The Convention contains a pro-victim bias, and as such the launching state will almost
certainly be found liable if the Convention can be invoked. See Reis, Some Reflections on the
Liability Convention for Outer Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 125 (1978); Cocca, The Principle of "Full
Compensation" in the Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Launched
into Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS ON THE FIFTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
92 (1972).
48. The regime established by the Convention requires, in the first instance, that the
claimant and the launching state attempt to resolve their dispute through diplomatic channels.
If diplomatic negotiations are unsuccessful after one year following the submission of the claim,
the parties are then entitled to invoke the Convention's claim procedures. See Arts. XIV-XX of
the Liability Convention. For discussions of various types of dispute resolution procedures
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and a method for setting up a Claims Commission is set forth.49
5. Moon Treaty
Perhaps the best known of the international treaties dealing with outer
space today is the so-called "Moon Treaty." In December, 1979, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a draft Agreement Gov50
erning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
The purpose of the treaty is stated in Article 11, which provides that:
"States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation
of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become
feasible."
B.

NATIONAL REGULATION

Besides these and other treaties, 5 ' outer space is regulated today by
various national laws. For example, the United States Congress passed a law
in 1981 making it illegal for an astronaut to kill a fellow astronaut while both
are in the space shuttle. 52 But no law would be broken if the killing took
which have been suggested for outer space conflicts, see Bockstiegel, ProposedDraft Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Disputes, 12 J. SPACE L. 136 (1984); Note, Dispute
Resolution in Space, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 211 (1984); Bockstiegel, Arbitration and
Adjudication Regarding Activities in Outer Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 3 (1978).
49. In the event that the parties are not able to resolve their differences amicably, a Claims
Commission can be called for by either party. See Art. XIV of the Treaty. The Commission
consists of three members, one of whom is nominated by the claimant, one of whom is selected
by the launching state, and one of whom is selected jointly by the parties. Id. at Art. XV.
Decisions of the Commission are not binding but are published. Id. at Art. XIX.
50. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess. (Supp. No. 20), U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979). See also U.N. G.A.
Res. 34/68 (Dec. 14, 1979). The Moon Treaty is discussed in Cheng, Moon Treaty: Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies within the Solar
System Other than the Earth. 33 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 213 (1980); Spitz, Space LawAgreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other CelestialBodies. 21 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 579 (1980); Works, The Moon Treaty, 9 DEN. J. INT'L & POL'Y. 281 (1980); Zedalis,
Will Article III of the Moon Treaty Improve Existing Law?-A Textual Analysis, 5 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 53 (1980). On July 11, 1984, the Moon Treaty came into force as enough states
became parties to it. See Christol, The Moon Treaty Enters Into Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 163
(1985).
51. A number of other treaties, especially with regard to satellite communications, have
been concluded. See generally InternationalCommunications, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167
(1984); Law and Security in Outer Space-Current Issues of Space Law before the United
Nations, 11 J. SPACE L. 5 (1983); InternationalSatellite Communications and the New Information Order: A Symposium, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 321 (1981).
52. Zieman, supra, note 18, at 1. The history of this law is interesting. In 1979 Congress was
considering the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1980, S. 1722,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), H. R.
6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Part of the Act proposed bringing spacecraft within the
"special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States," which extends the jurisdiction of the federal
government to airplanes while in flight. Under the proposal the word "aircraft" was to be
defined so as to include "any craft used or designed for flight or navigation in air or in space."
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place on the Moon, during a space walk or in a space station.53 It has also
been reported that the Internal Revenue Service considers space "no place
at all," and therefore will not recognize claims that income earned in outer
space is exempt from tax. 54 Indeed, even the most unlikely of laws-such as
the Uniform Code of Military Justice-have been suggested as possibly
having an effect on space law. 55 Of course, it must be remembered that six
When the Act ran into problems, the provision dealing with special aircraft jurisdiction was
attached as a rider to a NASA appropriations bill and became law when the appropriations bill
was enacted. See Zieman, supra note 18, at 16 and Menter, supranote 13, at 57-58. The special
aircraft jurisdiction of the United States is further discussed infra notes 115-119 and accompanying text. The amending of the special aircraft jurisdiction law so as to apply to spaceships
supplemented regulations which had been issued by NASA on March 7, 1980, which gave
shuttle commanders arrest powers and the right to use force if necessary to maintain law and
order in orbit. See 14 C.F.R. § 1214 (1980). For a general discussion of crimes in space, see
Note, The Extension of United States CriminalJurisdictionto Outer Space, 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 627 (1983).

53. Zieman, supra note 18, at 1. The reason why the enlarged special aircraft jurisdiction law
would be of no use is because the offense must take place aboard the spaceship itself. Thus,
attacks on the Moon or during a space walk could not be prosecuted because no court would be
able to establish jurisdiction over the crime. If a court were inclined to find jurisdiction,
however, it is likely that it could do so based on "universal interest." It is generally acknowledged that certain crimes are so offensive that any state may assert jurisdiction to punish the
crime, even if the crime was not committed in its territory, was not committed by one of its
nationals, and was otherwise not within that state's jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce. The
most ancient crime of universal interest is piracy. A succinct explanation of the principle can be
found in Re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] All E.R. 506. There Lord Sankey said, "a person
guilty of such piracy has placed himself beyond the protection of any state. He is no longer a
national, but hostis humanigeneris and as such he is justiciable by any state anywhere .... "Id.
at 507. Modern day crimes of universal interest include violence against diplomats, genocide,
hijacking, trading in slaves and war crimes. Perhaps the best known example of a state asserting
the principle of universal interest in modern times is that of Israel trying and convicting Adolf
Eichmann for acts he committed during World War II. Although Eichmann had no connection
with Israel (Eichmann was a German national when he committed the acts, the acts took place
in France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and other Eastern European countries, the State
of Israel did not exist at the time the acts were committed, and Eichmann was living in South
America at the time he was brought to trial), the Israeli Supreme Court nevertheless found that
Israel did have jurisdiction over Eichmann because it was acting as an organ and agent of the
international community and was meting out punishment to him because of his breach of the
law of nations. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (1968). Of
course, whether a crime (such as murder) committed in space would be a crime of universal
interest, thus allowing any court to exercise jurisdiction, is an open question. A strong
argument could be made, however, that any crime committed in space is of universal interest
because of the statement, contained in all of the outer space treaties concluded to date, which
proclaims that outer space shall be used only for peaceful purposes. Indeed, the United Nations
committee which is charged with developing space law treaties is called COPUOS, which stands
for the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. For a work which discusses the
founding of COPUOS, see Dembling & Aros, Space Law and the United Nations: The Work of
the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
32 J. AIR L. &CoM. 329 (1966). As such, a crime committed in space may well qualify as a crime
of universal interest.
54. Zieman, supra note 18, at 1.
55. Since almost all United States astronauts were members of the armed forces at the time
of their missions, any legal question arising during a mission (such as a mutiny, for example)
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countries in addition to the United States now possess the capacity to launch
56
satellites into space.
As is obvious, the international treaties which have been signed to date
are very broad. Indeed, they more closely resemble pronouncements, or
common aims, than they resemble true treaties.57 Thus, while they provide a
useful blueprint for the future development of space law, it is doubtful that
they can be understood in their present form to constitute substantive law. 58
As for the national laws which exist, it is obvious that such laws are narrowly
59
drawn, and have application in only very limited circumstances.
II. Existing Legal Mechanisms for Outer Space Rescue
A.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

It is likely that the single most important outer space issue that will be
faced for the rest of this century will have to do with the rescue of men and
could have been governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(1982). See
Gantt, The PermanentlyManned Space Station-A Challenge to the Legal Profession, 1 AIR AND
SPACE LAW. 1, 1 (1984). Soviet space crews have from time to time committed short-lived
mutinies. See Zieman, supra note 18, at 1, 16.
56. Currently the United States, the Soviet Union, France, China, India, Japan and the
United Kingdom have the ability to launch satellites into space. It is expected that many other
countries will soon have the same ability. Dula, Authorization and ContinuingSupervision of
U.S. Commercial Space Activities, 1 AIR AND SPACE LAW. 12, 12 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Dula].
57. Of course, it could be argued that all international agreements are mere pronouncements
of common aims, since there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the terms
of the treaty. Some philosophers-notably Hobbes, Pufendorf and Bentham-have argued
that there can be no law if there is no authority to enforce it, and have concluded from this
premise that to speak of international law as "law" is to engage in a deception. Perhaps the
classic statement of this school of thought is contained in 1 J. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 177
(1861). For modern day discussions, see M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, The Political Foundations of International Law 5 (1961) and J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

liii (1954). Besides the lack of an effective mechanism of enforcement, international law has
long suffered from the lack of an effective method of discovering violations. The magnitude of
this problem, however, has lessened gradually with the development of increasingly sophisticated observation satellites. Indeed, the willingness of the United States to sign the 1972
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) was based in part on the belief that it could verify
compliance by the Soviets through the use of survey satellites. See Jakhu & Trecroce, International Satellite Monitoring for Disarmament and Development, 5 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 509
(1980); How Satellites Help to Sell SALT, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 21, 1979, at 21.
The matter is also discussed in Lay, supra note 15, at 46.
58. Of course, if the rules embodied in the treaties begin to be followed by national courts,
the rules may begin to acquire the status of customary international law. See The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Because most of the treaties on outer space concluded to date
have been ratified by so few states, some commentators have argued that the treaties can
probably not acquire the status of customary international law. See Dula, Private Sector
Activities in Outer Space, 19 INT'L LAW. 159, 177 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Private Sector].
59. The United States has attempted at times to mitigate this problem by enacting broadly
worded statutes. Recall the amending of the special aircraft jurisdiction, discussed supra
note 52.
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machines from space. Indeed, although mishaps in space to date have been
few and far between, when they have occurred they have invariably been
caused by the malfunctioning of machinery while in space. 60 The topic of
space rescues has concerned man since the idea of space travel first began to
loom as a distinct possibility. Space rescues, of course, had already occurred
prior to Challenger. As noted earlier, American astronauts had been called

upon to repair crippled satellites.6 1 Moreover, the world had already had a
glimpse of what an in-space rescue of astronauts would be like. For a few
brief but harrowing days in 1970, American officials were faced with the
need to devise rescue strategies when the Apollo 13 mission had to be
aborted following the rupture of a service module oxygen tank.6 2

Unlike Challenger, whose rescue mission took place on Earth, a rescue
operation in space could become necessary for one of several reasons. First,
of course, is the need to repair crippled satellites. As the number of satellites
in space continues to increase, 63 and as more and more satellites are put into

space by private investors who cannot afford to simply abandon satellites
which become inoperative,64 repair missions will become increasingly com60. The first American space fatality occurred on January 27, 1967, when a fire aboard
Apollo I killed Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White and Roger B. Chaffee. The Soviet space
program suffered its first death three months later when Colonel Vladimir Komarov fell four
miles to earth in Soyuz I after its parachute failed to open properly. In 1971, cosmonauts Georgi
Dobrovolsky, Vladislav Volkov and Viktor Patsayev suffocated during reentry of their Salyut I
space station. See Doubts and Changes After PastDisasters, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at A14,
col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Doubts], and Murphy, It Was Not the FirstTime, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986,
at 45. As to the rights of astronauts to sue, see Lauter, Shuttle Suits Would Raise Complex
Issues, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 10, 1986, at 3, col. 1, and Margolick, Shuttle Lawsuits: Question is
When, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, at B10, col. 1.
61. See supra note 6.
62. In April 1970 an oxygen tank aboard Apollo 13 exploded two days after the start of the
voyage. The accident was the result of a fire caused by a short circuit. The crew of three
astronauts was forced to move into the lunar lander while oxygen was vented from the
command module and the fire put out. Although the crew was unable to go to the Moon as
scheduled, the rest of the mission was carried out as planned. The incident is recalled in Doubts,
supra note 60, at A14, col. 2.
63. There are now an estimated 138 satellites in orbit, and an additional 160 satellites are
planned. Netter, Third World Seeks Its Place in Space, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15,1985, at E7, col. 1.
For the extent to which satellites have come to dominate everyday life, see Private Sector, supra
note 58, at 164-165, 168-169; Joyner, Selling Satellites: the Commercialization of LANDSA T,
26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 63 (1985).
64. Although space holds the promise of rich rewards for those who reap its vast resources,
investment in space technologies has been slowed by the high costs and substantial risks which
investors face. It has been pointed out, for example, that a space venture has the following
disadvantages when compared to a similar venture on earth: (1) a need for up to six times the
amount of capital; (2) the prospect that the venture will fail because of the remote and hostile
environment in which it must be carried out; (3) the inability to take advantage of such
favorable tax laws as the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation schedules; (4) the
likelihood that the venture will not begin to show acceptable levels of profit for seven to ten
years, (5) the difficulty of securing insurance of adequate size and scope; and, (6) the number of
governmental regulations with which must be complied. Miglicco, Investment Opportunities in
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mon. Second will be the need to rescue astronauts who become stranded in
space. This, of course, was the situation which the Apollo 13 astronauts
found themselves in at the outset of their mission. With the advent of regular
space shuttle flights, an increasing number of persons will start to occupy
space. As many of these persons will be civilians engaged in the employ of
private corporations,6 5 there will need to be a mechanism developed to

Space, 2 AIR AND SPACE LAW. 9, 11 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Miglicco]. The picture for space
entrepreneurs is not, however, completely bleak. On October 29, 1984, for example, James M.
Beggs, then Administrator of NASA, issued the NASA Commercial Space Policy and Implementation Plan. The purpose of the plan is to "expand opportunities for U.S. private sector
investment and involvement in civil space and space-related activities." The plan was developed following an amendment to the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2455 etseq. (1982), which directed NASA to "seek and encourage, to the maximum
extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space ... " Under the plan, five policies are to be
followed: (a) Government should establish new links with the private sector; (b) the marketplace, not government, should determine the viability of a proposed project; (c) whether a
proposed project should be operated by the public or by private sector should be decided by
which sector can more efficiently carry out the venture; (d) government should only expend
funds on projects which the private sector will not finance; and, (e) government should not
subsidize any private space project unless significant private capital has been placed at risk and
the project is likely to yield significant benefits for the nation. For a further discussion of the
plan and NASA's efforts to implement it, see Dentzer, The Starship Free Enterprise,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, and Burnett, NASA Commercial Space Policy, 2 AIR. AND SPACE
LAW. 7 (1985). For general discussions of the benefits as well as the problems inherent in having
private industry assume responsibility for space operations, see Private Sector, supra note 58,
Gantt, The Commercializationof Space-Twenty Years of Experience: Some Lessons Learned,
12 J. SPACE L. 109 (1984); Marshall, Commercialization of Space: Incentives, Impediments and
Alternatives, 12 J. SPACE L. 163 (1984); Fuqua, Space Industrialization:Some Legal and Policy
Considerationsfor PrivateEnterprise, 8 J. SPACE L. 1 (1980) and Robinson, Private Management's Operationof the Space Shuttle; Some Legal Problems Related to Market Entry, 13 AKRON
L. REV. 601 (1980).
65. It has been estimated, for example, that by the year 2010 space industries will generate
$65 billion in annual revenues and employ ten million workers. Zieman, supra note 18, at 1.
Many of these workers will perform their jobs in space, where the near complete absence of
gravity, contaminating particles and vibrations provide a very attractive environment for the
development of special alloys, crystals, glass and fiberoptics. See Miglicco, supra note 64, at
9-10. Already, more than twenty companies have told NASA that they wish to build space
factories on the proposed U.S. space station, which is scheduled to be open by the early 1990s.
Davies, Gold in Them Thar Orbits, J. COM., Oct. 4, 1985, at 1A, col. 3. Even before the 1990s
are reached, however, many workers will find their livelihoods connected with space. Already,
some 3,400 workers are employed by the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT),
a company with 68,000 shareholders and a net income of $43 million on $400 million of sales.
Dula, supra note 56, at 13. COMSAT is a private company which was created in 1962 by an Act
of Congress as a for profit corporation. Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419, now codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1982). Under its charter COMSAT is authorized to create and, either by
itself or in cooperation with others (including foreign governments and businesses) operate "a
commercial communications satellite system." The workers who live in space, of course, will
bring their families, further increasing the number of persons in space. See Costello, supra note
19. In addition, there will be persons in space for short periods of time as "tourists." T.C.
Swartz of Society Expeditions announced earlier this year that his company hoped to have three
to five voyages a year to outer space by the mid-1990s. It is envisioned that approximately
60-100 persons could be carried on each trip. Richey, Shuttle Puts Stars In Eyes of One Travel
Agent, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 29, 1985, at 3.
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ensure their safe return to earth. Another scenario which would require a
rescue in outer space would involve members of a space station. Soviet
Soyuzes and American Skylabs have begun to dot the heavens, and the 211
consecutive days in space recorded by the members of the Soyuz T-5 in 1983
was merely the first step towards permanent space stations. 66 It is not
difficult to imagine, therefore, of a need arising to bring medicine or some

other vital item to a space station. A final way in which a need for a rescue
might occur is if a country's satellite or space station were in danger of
breaking up and posing, either in outer space or upon re-entry into the
earth's atmosphere, a health hazard. During the 1978 incident involving the
Soviet Union's Cosmos 954, a serious fear of radiation existed.6 7 If the time
comes when such a situation is again present, we may find that a country
other than the launching country possesses the ability to retrieve and either
repair or dispose of the satellite before it has a chance to cause the
threatened health hazard. In such circumstances, the efforts of the second
country would also be in the nature of rescue.

66. As part of his State of the Union address on January 25, 1984, President Reagan
announced that, "Tonight I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space
station, and to do it within a decade." Message from the President on the State of the Union,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1984, at B8, col. 1. Much has been written about permanent manned
stations and the legal issues they will create. See, e.g., Smith, et al., Legal Implications of a
Permanent Manned Presence in Space, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 857 (1983). Earlier this year the
Soviet Union acknowledged that the crew of the Soyuz T-13 had successfully rescued the
crippled Salyut 7 space station, marking the first time that a space station had been rescued and
repaired in space. Mydans, Soviet Official Provides Detail on Daring Rescue of Failed Space
Station, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1985, at D19, col. 1. Following the repairs the space station was
put back into use. Schmemann, Soviet Astronauts Rocket Into Orbit-Threeon Board Capsule
Are Set to Join Two Others in Repaired Space Station, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at A19,
col. 1.
67. Cosmos 954 was an ocean surveillance satellite that was launched by the Soviets on
September 18, 1977. On January 6, 1978, the satellite suffered severe depressurization and
began to fall. Eighteen days later the satellite reentered the earth's atmosphere and spread
debris over a 124,000 square mile area of Canada's Northwest Territories. The Cosmos was
powered by a nuclear reactor which used uranium enriched with the isotope U-235. Because it
was feared that the reactor would cause contamination, the Canadian Armed Forces and the
Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada conducted an extensive air and ground operation
designed to locate and remove the satellite and any nuclear debris. Known as Operation
Morning Light, it cost $14 million (Can.) to mount. One year later Canada presented to the
Soviet Union a demand that it reimburse Canada for approximately half the costs incurred by
Operation Morning Light. Ultimately, the claim was resolved through diplomatic channels,
with the U.S.S.R. agreeing to pay a much smaller amount to Canada. See Protocol Between the
Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow, Apr. 2, 1981, reprinted in 20 INT'L LEG. MAT. 689 (1981). For discussions of the
Cosmos 954 incident, see Notes, Convention on InternationalLiabilityfor Damage Caused by
Space Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 255 (1985); Galloway, Nuclear Powered Satellites: The U.S.S.R. Cosmos
954 and the Canadian Claim, 12 AKRON L. REV. 401 (1979).
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B.

THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
AND ITS INADEQUACIES

If and when the need arises for rescue missions, it seems clear that the
technical ability to carry out such missions either will exist or will be
developed quickly.68 The question that remains is whether the legal

mechanisms will exist with which to deal with the ramifications of such
efforts. Despite the existence of present treaties, it is likely that a rescue

operation would not be governed by them. For one thing, the treaties
envision that disputants to any lawsuit will be national governments. The

reason for this is that most treaties were drafted during the early years of
space travel, when such efforts were being undertaken solely by national
governments. Thus, a rescue operation involving private parties would not
necessarily fall within the parameters of the treaties. 69 Moreover, the possibility exists that a rescue operation would involve both private and public

parties. Thus, for example, a privately financed space venture could run into
trouble and be rescued by a state's spaceship. Alternatively, a public
spaceship could become stranded somewhere in the galaxy and be rescued
by another spaceship funded by a private consortium of investors.
Even if the treaties are found to apply in a given situation, it is likely that
their lack of specificity 70 will leave many questions unanswered. But it is
more probable that the treaties will be silent. This turned out to be the case
in February 1984, when two different satellites-the Indonesian Palapa B-2
and the Western Union Westar VI-failed upon launching. Because none of
the existing treaties covered these privately-financed ventures, the private
bar was called upon to draft contracts outlining the terms and conditions
upon which the satellites were to be rescued and repaired. 7' Five different

68. The United States has already developed a rescue program (which it practices frequently) in the event that the Shuttle crashes on earth. See Broad, Far-FlungRescue Teams Again
Rehearse Drills for Crash of Space Shuttle, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at B12, col. 1. In
addition, the United States has made overtures to the U.S.S.R. for the development of a joint
rescue program. Soviets Reject Joint Practicefor Space Rescue, NASA Says, Christian Sci.
Monitor, June 12, 1985, at 2. The United States rescue plan was not put into effect during
Challenger because the plan can only be used if the shuttle actually crashes on earth, as opposed
to Challenger, which exploded in flight.
69. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, discussed supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text,
does not define who is an astronaut; indeed, the Agreement does not even use the term
astronaut except in its title, referring instead to "personnel of a spacecraft." See Arts. 1-5 of the
Agreement. Neither does Article V of the Outer Space Treaty, discussed supra notes 34-39.
Only the Moon Treaty, discussed supra note 44 and accompanying text, expressly states that all
persons on the Moon are covered by its terms. See Art. 10.
70. See supra text following note 56.
71. The following account is adapted from Smith & Lopatkiewicz, Sattelite Recovery: A
Lawyer's Perspective, 2 AIR. AND SPACE LAW. 1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Smith]. See also
Wilford, Astronauts Snare ErrantSatellitefor the First Time, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at Al,
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sets of attorneys-from Lloyd's of London, the lead insurance underwriter;
Western Union; Perumtel, the insurance company representing the Indonesian government in that government's insurance claim for the failure of
Palapa; NASA; and the Hughes Aircraft Company, which built the Palapa
and Westar-were needed to hammer out five different contracts: an agreement with Perumtel settling the claims of the Indonesian goverment; a
contract with Western Union authorizing the underwriters to recover the
Westar VI; a preliminary, and later a final, agreement with NASA to
recover the Palapa; a preliminary, and later a final, agreement with NASA
to recover the Westar VI; and two separate contracts with Hughes Aircraft
Company for recovery of the Palapa and Westar VI. Although one of the

largest problems facing the attorneys involved in the drafting of these
various contracts was the fact that the insurance policies on the two satellites

were silent on the question of the standard of loss governing a launch
failure, 72 two other major problems were the lack of standard salvage
agreements which could be used as models for the contracts to be negotiated
and the uncertainty as to the state of the law which would govern whatever

arrangements were ultimately concluded.7 3 Luckily, the lawyers who
worked on the case were able, after much deliberation (and more than a
little arm twisting) to draft the contracts in time. But the fact that the
negotiations proved so time-consuming that interim agreements were neces74
sary to preserve the status quo while final agreements were hammered out
make it clear that some sort of standard regime is necessary.75
col. 6; Insurer Delighted by Space Rescue and Implications, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at C3,
col. 1.
72. Smith, supra note 71, at 16.
73. Id. It should be pointed out that this confusion existed despite the fact that other
satellites had failed in the past, resulting in large payment by insurers. Indeed, Lloyds had
previously paid $70 million to RCA after an RCA satellite was lost. For a discussion of space
insurance, see Hosenball, supra note 5, at 72-73; Margo, Some Aspects of Insuring Satellites,
1979 INS. L.J. 555. Recently, INTEC, one of the major U.S. underwriters of communications
satellites, announced that it would no longer insure the performance of a satellite prior to its
successful positioning and operation in orbit. INTEC said that the unprecedented failure of
seven communications satellites to be successfully installed between January 1984 and August
1985 had led to its decision. See Adell, Satellite Insurer Ends Launch Risk Coverage, J. COM.
Sept. 19, 1985, at IA, col. 5. Satellite insurance, which was first sold in 1968, had been profitable
in all but three years between 1968 and 1983. During 1984 and 1985, however, underwriters
sustained $600 million in losses from satellite claims. Id. at 8A, col. 1. In the wake of
Challenger, some observers predicted a further increase in the cost of space insurance. See
Sloane, Cost of Insurance in Space May Rise, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at A14, col. 6.
74. Smith, supra note 71, at 18.
75. Although the experience has been credited with establishing "new concepts of salvage
for the satellite insurance industry" and prompting "the development of unprecedented
contractual relationships transferring title to satellites in outer space and effectuating the
retrieval of such spacecraft," id., it is obvious that the world should not rely on the cooperation
of the parties and the creativity of the lawyers involved each time an unfortunate incident
involving outer space occurs.
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IV. Applying Admiralty Law to
Outer Space Rescues

A.

OVERVIEW OF LAW OF SALVAGE

As stated earlier, admiralty has a highly refined law of salvage. 76 Salvage

law in a maritime context first emerged in 3 B.c., when the Rhodians
compiled a comprehensive maritime code which included salvage. 77 Then,
as now, salvage consisted of three basic elements. 78 First, the property
which is the subject of a salvage claim must have been in either actual danger
or in imminent risk of danger. Second, the act of salving the property must
have been voluntary on the part of the person or persons who performed the
salvage. Third, the salvage must have been at least partially successful. If a
salvor can demonstrate that its efforts contained all three elements, it
becomes entitled to remuneration in the form of a salvage award. Although

the legal justification for such remuneration has usually been laid at the feet
of implied contract, 79 central to all discussions of maritime salvage has been
the notion of encouraging future rescuers by rewarding past rescuers. 80 In
this sense, sea law is very different from shore law, where the well-meaning
interloper has not only not been rewarded for its efforts,8 1 but has often
found itself the subject of lawsuits for negligence in the performance of the
rescue. 82

76. See supra text following note 20.
77. For a discussion of the Rhodian origins of salvage law, see 3A M. NORRis, BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY § 5, at 1-6 (1980). It should be pointed out, however, that some commentators have
criticized the idea that the Rhodians created such a code. See Benedict, The HistoricalPosition
of the Rhodean Law, 18 YALE L.J. 223 (1909).
78. For a general overview of past and present salvage law, see G. BRICE, MARITIME LAW OF
SALVAGE (1983).

79. See, e.g., Coulthard, A New CureforSalvors?-A ComparativeAnalysis of the LOF1980
andthe C.M.I. Draft Salvage Convention, 14 J. MAR. L. & COM. 45, 45(1983) [hereinafter cited
as Coulthard].
80. Judge Clark expressed this policy well in Kimes v. United States, 207 F.2d 60,63 (2d Cir.
1953), when he wrote that, "the fundamental public policy at the basis of awards of salvage [is]
the encouragement of seamen to render prompt service in future emergencies."
81. In G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8-1, at 532 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Gilmore], it is said that: "On land the person who rushes in to save
another's property from danger is an officious intermeddler, the volunteer whom even equity
will not aid."
82. In recent years some states have sought to protect the well meaning land volunteer by
passing so-called Good Samaritan statutes. It should also be pointed out that even at sea, a
salvor who performs in a negligent manner can be the subject of a lawsuit. In most cases,
however, the salvor receives its rebuke in the form of decreased compensation for its efforts.
Even when a salvor has performed negligently, courts tend to cast a benevolent eye toward the
salvor. See The Cape Race, 18 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1927); Serviss v. Ferguson, 84 F. 202 (2d Cir.
1897). For a further discussion of the law regarding negligent maritime salvage, see Rudolph,
Negligent Salvage: Reduction of A ward, Forfeitureof A ward or Damages?, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM.
419 (1976).
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Admiralty law has never sought to define what kinds of rescue services
will qualify as salvage, preferring instead to approach each case on a first
impression basis. Some of the more familiar circumstances in which salvage
has been awarded include: (1) towing, piloting or navigating a ship in danger
to safety; (2) standing by a ship in danger; (3) holding a stranded vessel in
position; (4) supplying crew to a ship short of crew; and, (5) extinguishing a
fire aboard a ship. 83
1. "No cure-no pay"
Perhaps the most important practice which emerged in the development
of maritime salvage law was the principle of "no cure-no pay." Under this
principle, a salvor is denied any award if the salvage operation is unsuccessful, and cannot even recover its expenses. Despite its seeming harshness,
this principle has three salutory effects. First, it tends to dissuade unsavory
or incompetent salvors. Second, it provides courts with a means for measuring the amount to be awarded a salvor. Since the funds to pay salvage awards
come from a judicial sale of the property saved, 84 admiralty courts cannot
grant the salvor an award larger than the amount saved. While in theory this
allows courts to grant an award equal to the value of the property salved
(thus resulting in a 100 percent award), in practice courts tend to pick some
number-usually no more than 25-30 percent)-which will compensate the
salvor for its effort and provide some amount of the cost of rendering the
services.8 5 The third beneficial advantage of the no cure-no pay principle is
that salvors who are successful are assured of being able to collect. Since the
proceeds come out of the award, concerns about the financial worthiness of
the owner of the property are unnecessary.
2. Rule of Voluntariness

In addition to the principle of no cure-no pay there developed the rule of
voluntariness. As stated above, salvage services must be voluntarily provided. Thus, if the salvor is under a preexisting duty to salve the property, a
salvage award is simply not possible. The most common example of a salvor

83. These examples are drawn from K. McGUFFIE, KENNEDY'S CIVIL SALVAGE 6-7 (4th ed.
1958).
84. In most cases, however, a judicial sale does not take place because the true owner of the
property steps forward and satisfies the salvor's award from other sources of income.
85. Although no salvage award has ever reached 100% of the value of the salved property,
some judicial support exists for such an amount. In the Petition of the United States (Vessel
Invincible), 229 F. Supp. 241,245 (D. Or. 1963), the court stated in dictum "that under unusual
circumstances, the total value of the vessel might be awarded to the salvors." Professors
Gilmore and Black have noted that at one time the standard figure of recovery was set at 50% of
the salved property's value. As the value of ships escalated, the average figure dropped to about
25-30%. Gilmore, supra note 83, § 8-10, at 563.
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being under a duty to render salvage services is the Coast Guard. Since one
of the purposes of the Coast Guard is to provide aid to mariners in distress,
salvage services rendered by Guardsmen result in no salvage award. 86 In

most instances, crew
members who salvage their own ship are also not
87
entitled to salvage.

Most maritime salvage which is undertaken today is done by professional
salvors who work under contract. These commercial salvors are sometimes
supplanted by non-professional salvors because of the vagaries of time. In
most cases, however, professional salvors eventually take over the opera-

tion because they possess fleets of ships (mostly tugboats) which are especially outfitted to undertake salvage operations. Because salvage operations

often must begin as soon as possible if they are to have any chance of being
successful, the development of standard salvage contracts-which leave

little, if anything, to negotiation-has occurred. Although there are a number of such salvage agreements in existence today, 88 the most popular of
such agreements is the so-called Lloyd's Open Form. Developed by the

underwriters at Lloyd's of London shortly before the close of the last
century, the Lloyd's form is generally acknowledged as a form which is fair
to both the salvor (called the contractor) and the party whose property is to
be salved. The Lloyds form has been amended several times. The form now
in use was approved of in 1980, and is referred to as LOF 1980.89

86. One of the duties of the Coast Guard is "to render aid to distressed persons, vessels and
aircraft on the high seas and on waters over which the United States has jurisdiction." See 14
U.S.C. § 88 (1982). Because of this duty to rescue, the Guard is routinely prohibited from
claiming salvage. See, e.g., Beach Salvage Corp. of Florida v. The Cap'n Tom, 201 F. Supp. 479
(S.D. Fla. 1961); The Lyman M. Law, 122 F. 816 (D. Me. 1903). But see United States v.
American Oil Co.-The Amoco Virginia, 417 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1036 (1970).
87. If the ship is abandoned and a crew member later salvages the vessel, the crewman is
entitled to an award of salvage. The explanation for this result is that although the crewman
originally had a duty to try to salvage the vessel, that duty came to an end when the ship was
abandoned. See The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240,268 (1804). Others who have from time to
time been held to be under a preexisting duty to salvage include the passengers of the salved
ship, members of the Armed Forces, and harbor firemen. One must be careful not to generalize
too much in this area, because the preexisting duty has been riddled with exceptions. See
Gilmore, supra note 81, §§ 8-5 to 8-7, at 546-558,-for a comprehensive discussion.
88. Miller, Lloyd's StandardForm of Salvage Agreement-"LOF1980": A Commentary, 12
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 243, 244 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Miller], discusses the German, French,
Chinese and Russian salvage forms, while Gilmore, supra note 81, § 8-15, at 582 n.130a,
discusses an American salvage form.
89. For a discussion of the Lloyd's Open Form, see Coulthard, supra note 79; Miller, supra
note 88; and Bessemer-Clark, The Role of Lloyd's Open Form [1980] LLOYD'S MAR. COM. L.Q.
297 [hereinafter cited as Bessemer-Clark].
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SALVAGE LAW AND SPACE RESCUE

1. Satellites
With this brief overview of maritime salvage law, it is possible to turn to
rescues in outer space and see how maritime salvage rules could be applied
to such rescues. The first type of rescue in space-that of satellites--could
benefit greatly from maritime salvage law. As will be recalled, one of the
major problems prior to the rescue of the Indonesian Palapa B-2 and the
Western Union Westar VI satellites was the time-consuming negotiations
which had to be conducted in order to conclude suitable contract
arrangements. 90 Had the parties been able to turn to something like a
Lloyd's Open Form the lengthy negotiations could have been substantially
shortened. 91 Moreover, maritime salvage law would have provided a solution if the rescue operation had either failed or was only partially
successful,9 2 and would have guaranteed the rescuer, NASA, a means of
collecting payment if the other parties had failed to compensate NASA as
93
provided in the arrangements which were finally agreed upon.
2. Stranded Astronauts
The second type of rescue likely to occur in space is the rescue of stranded
astronauts. Of course, there does already exist some law on this question.
The 1968 Astronaut Rescue Agreement 94 requires contracting states to take
all appropriate steps to help secure the safe return of astronauts. But as has
been noted by a commentator, 95 the key question which the treaty leaves
90. See supra text accompanying note 74.
91. As will be recalled, see supra text following note 87, one of the principal reasons why the
Lloyd's Open Form was developed was to avoid the need to "dicker" about every term of the
contract. In this way, the parties are able to conclude a salvage contract quickly so that the
salvage effort may begin promptly.
92. Under the terms of the agreements which were worked out, NASA was required to
refund the advance it received in the event that performance could not be completed. Smith,
supra note 71, at 18.
93. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Concern over whether full payment would be
forthcoming played a role in shaping the position taken by NASA during the initial negotiations
with Lloyd's:
When the prospect of recovery was first discussed with NASA, the underwriters harbored
some hope that the agency would participate without charge because of the publicity benefits
the mission offered. NASA's representatives, however, indicated a strong desire to be paid
for their effort, or at least for some identifiable portion of it, and negotiated with the
underwriters for both single satellite and double satellite recovery prices.
Id.
The position taken by NASA should have come as no surprise to the underwriters. As will be
recalled, supra note 64, by the time that the negotiations were initiated, Congress had ordered,
and NASA was in the midst of developing, a policy of requiring the private sector to bear an
increased portion of space mission costs.
94. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
95. Dembling, supra note 42. It is clear that the rescuing state may recover if it has been
requested by the launching state to rescue. But if the launching state does not so request, it is
doubtful that the rescuing state can recover. Id. at 132.
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leaves open is whether a state other than the launching state may recover its
expenses for helping to secure the safe return. Another question left open by
the treaty is whether compensation can be awarded if the astronauts who
are
96
saved are part of a private venture as opposed to a public venture.
The application of admiralty law provides an answer here, although it is

an answer with which many in the maritime field are uncomfortable. The
rule was established long ago that if only persons were saved, no salvage
award could be rendered. But if persons and property were salved, then an
award of salvage could be made out of the proceeds raised by the sale of the
salved property. Unfortunately, the result of these maxims "was a natural
temptation to save property first and look around for survivors later. " 97 The
reason why admiralty has historically resisted the notion of awarding salvage
for "pure life salvage" has been a feeling on the part of the bench that
salvage cannot be awarded where there is no res out of which an award of

salvage can come. Another reason is that salvage law was developed at a
time when courts were not routinely accustomed to placing a value on
human life, an exercise which today, of course, occurs quite frequently.
Throughout this century, commentators have urged the adoption of pure
life salvage. 98 Although two international conventions on salvage have been

drafted-the first in 1910 and the second in 1980-on both occasions the
concept of pure life salvage was rejected. 99

96. The treaty speaks of states, and says that states are responsible for the space activities of
their nationals and of spaceships registered in the state's territory. Thus, while in theory it
makes no difference whether the spaceship in question is publicly or privately funded, in
practice it will make a significant amount of difference because some states will carefully
regulate commercial space activities while other states will not. Uneven application of regulatory standards and assumption of responsibility for privately caused liability has been a constant
source of problems in the maritime world, where many states have adopted very lax standards
of control so as to encourage shipowners to register in their territory. Such states are known as
"Flags of Convenience," and are discussed in R. CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE (1981).
97. Gilmore, supra note 81, § 8-1, at 532. Historically, the saving of life was regarded as
fulfilling a moral duty but not as entitling the salvor to a reward. In 1912, Congress enacted a
law, 37 Stat. 242, 46 U.S.C. § 728, which provides that, "Salvors of human life, who have taken
part in the services rendered on the occasion of the accident giving rise to salvage, are entitled to
a fair share of the remuneration awarded to the salvors of the vessel, her cargo, and accessories. " The law also places a duty upon "the master or person in charge of a vessel... so far as he
can do so without serious danger to his own vessel, crew, or passengers, [to] render assistance to
every person who is found at sea in danger of being lost." Criminal penalties are provided for
violation of this duty.
98. See e.g., Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779 (1954) and
Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at Sea, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1218 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Friedell].
99. For a thorough discussion of the 1910 Convention, often called the Brussels Convention,
see I. WILDEBOER, THE BRUSSELS SALVAGE CONVENTION (1965). In 1981 the Comite Maritime
International prepared a new Draft Salvage Convention to take the place of the 1910 Convention. Despite strong interest by a number of the delegates, the new Convention continued to
provide no compensation for pure life salvage. A copy of the Draft Convention is reprinted in
VOL. 20, NO. 2
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3. Bringing Aid to Space Stations
A third type of rescue which could become necessary would be the
bringing of medicine or some other type of vital item to a space station. In
1977 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with just such a
situation. In Peninsular& Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil
Carriers,1°° a question arose whether salvage had been earned by a ship
which came to the aid of a crewman stricken on another ship. In July 1973
the S.T. Overseas Progress was travelling in the mid-Atlantic Ocean when
her sixty-three-year-old fireman, William Turpin, was suddenly stricken
with severe chest pains. The Progress carried no doctor and as Turpin's
condition grew increasingly more serious, it became apparent to his fellow
crew members that he had suffered a heart attack. The Progress therefore
sent out a distress call to all ships in the area with a doctor aboard. The S.S.
Canberra, a vessel owned by the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation
Company, answered the call. The Canberra was an exceedingly fast ship and
was equipped with a full hospital. The Canberra changed her course so as to
intercept the Progress. When the two ships met, Turpin was transferred to
the Canberra, and as a result was able to get the medical attention he
required. Following this incident, the owners of the Canberra sought to
collect from the owners of the Progress $8,500, which was the cost incurred
by the Canberra in assisting the Progress and her fallen seaman. When the
owners of the Progress refused to pay the requested amount, the owner of
the Canberra brought suit.
The District Court denied all but $500 of the claim, 10 1 holding that the
situation was governed by the rules of pure life salvage. On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed. The court sidestepped the question of whether the
case presented a situation of pure life salvage, and sought to ground its
decision on the basis of quasi-contract principles by placing heavy stress on
the fact that the Progress had summoned the Canberra.10 2 For outer space
purposes, the decision of the Second Circuit provides a firm basis for
awarding to a spaceship which ferries needed supplies to a space station (or

57 TUL. L. REV. 1448 (1983), and the key provision, Art. 3-5, appears at 1453. The Draft is
generally discussed in Sheen, Conventions on Salvage, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
100. 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977). The case is also discussed by Friedell, supra note 98, at
1275-85.
101. 553 F.2d at 833. Judge Goettel of the Southern District granted P. & 0. $500 for nursing
services which were provided to Turpin while he was aboard by the Canberra. Since shipowners
have a duty to provide their crews with medical care because of the traditional rule of
"maintenance and cure," Judge Goettel reasoned that the nursing services provided while he
was aboard the Canberra were actually the obligation of the Progress. For a discussion of
maintenance and cure, see Jarvis, Rethinking the Meanning of the Phrase "Surviving Widow" in
the Jones Act: Has the Time Come for Admiralty Courts to Fashiona FederalLaw of Domestic
Relations? 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 463, 469 n.20 (1985).
102. 553 F.2d at 835.
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another ship) its reasonable costs and expenses. As the Second Circuit
noted, what constitutes reasonable costs and expenses will depend in large
part on the particular circumstances of the given case. 103
4. Health and Pollution Threats
The final type of outer space rescue likely to occur would involve a case
where one spaceship was able to prevent (or limit) health hazards posed by
another spaceship. The health and pollution threats posed by malfunctioning (as well as properly functioning) satellite and space ships have been
estimated to be quite large. Once again, admiralty law provides useful
precedents. With the exception of a few older English cases which arguably
strayed from the general rule, the general rule until quite recently was that
no salvage award could be rendered to a salvor who prevented damage, and
thus liability, to third parties.10 4 Beginning in the 1970s, however, the
increasing use of large supertankers to carry oil and other hazardous chemi10 5
cals required a rethinking and subsequent modification of the rule.
The problem posed by large supertankers can be illustrated by an incident
which occurred in July 1979. In that month a collision took place between
the supertankers Aegean Captain and Atlantic Empress.' 0 6 The Captain
suffered only minimal damage, but the Empress, which was leaking badly,
had to be towed out to sea by the salvors who had been engaged, pursuant to
a Lloyds' form, to salve her. The salvors worked for two weeks but despite
their efforts, the Empress suffered explosions which caused the death of one
salvor and the loss of thousands of dollars of salvage equipment. Because
the salvors were working under a no cure-no pay form, they received no
remuneration for their extensive effort and expense. Although the salvors
were unable to salve the Empress, they did confer a benefit on the owners of
the Empress. At the time when the collision first occurred and the Empress
began to leak oil, the coastline of Tobago, which was near the point of
collision, was threatened by the leaking oil. Of course, oil is one of the most
destructive substances which can be introduced into the ocean, as past
supertanker incidents had proven. 107 By towing the Empress three hundred
103. Id. at 836.
104. The Buffalo, 58 LLOYD'S LIST L. R. 302 (Adm. Div. 1937) and The Whippingham, 48
LLOYD'S L. REP. 49 (1934) are usually cited as providing some support for the principle that a
salvor who prevents liability is entitled to compensation. See also The Gregerso, [19731 1 Q.B.
274.
105. The rule and its subsequent modification is discussed in detail in Jarvis, International
Aspects of Salvage and GeneralAverage,in D. ABECASSIS & R. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM
SHIPS 141-172 (1985).
106. The following account is based on that which appears in Coulthard, supra note 79, at 50.
107. See Jarvis, Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Company: A New Opportunity For

Industry to End State Regulation of Coastal Oil Pollution?, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 265, 266-270
(1984).
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miles out to sea, and thus eliminating the threat to the Tobago coast, the
salvors prevented any liability from arising on the part of the Empress's
owners. Due to the salvors' failure to save any of the property of the owners,
however, the salvors were unable to claim a salvage award.
In the years before 1980, situations like that encountered with the
Empress were sometimes capable of being mitigated through the principle
of enhancement. Under enhancement, a salvor who had salved at least some
property and had prevented or minimized pollution routinely received a
larger award than a salvor who merely salved property. Of course, enhancement was only available where there was at least some property salved.
Professional salvors felt very strongly about the issues raised by the
Empress. Compounding their frustration with the no cure-no pay principle
was the fact that salving a ship laden with oil is more difficult than salving a
ship not laden with oil. Specifically, a ship laden with oil poses four unique
obstacles. 108 First, as damage to the vessel increases, the size of any potential spill increases, thereby reducing the amount of salvable cargo, which
thereby reduces the size of any award which might be granted. Second, the
existence of an oil spill makes a salvage operation physically more difficult
because of the attendant dirt and smell. Third, the operation becomes
politically more difficult as states whose coastlines are threatened feel
motivated politically to intervene. Although such intervention is often
well-intentioned, the net result is that the professional salvor loses the
ability to conduct the salvage operation in an efficient manner. The fourth
problem is that the already high costs borne by professional salvors are
increased in the event of an oil spill because of the special handling required
by oil spills.
These problems were partially addressed in the early 1980s when the
Lloyd's Open Form was revised and a Draft Salvage Convention was prepared. Although the schemes adopted in the form and the Draft Convention
differ somewhat, their basic thrust is the same. They provide what is commonly referred to as a "safety net," although in recent years this scheme has
been increasingly called "liability salvage." Under the safety net, an exception to the principle of no cure-no pay is made where the property to be
salved is a tanker laden with oil. The exception allows the salvor to recover
his reasonable expenses plus a mark-up not to exceed 15 percent if, under
traditional principles of salvage law, the salvor would fail to earn any award.
After five years of this new regime, it appears that the safety net is working,
although the professional salvage community continues to be financially
troubled.

108. These problems were first identified and discussed by Bessemer-Clark,supra note 89, at

298.
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Returning to space law, it is easy to envision a rescue operation which,
although unable to salve the satellite or spaceship in question, does succeed
in neutralizing the health hazard posed by it. In such a situation, should the
salvor receive an award? The answer is undoubtedly yes, since the salvor has
conferred a benefit on those responsible for the satellite or spaceship by
helping them to avoid the massive liability which would have resulted if the
health hazard had been left unchecked. By applying admiralty law principles
of liability salvage, it would be easy to decide how much of an award to grant
the salvor.
V. Incorporation of Admiralty Law into Space Law
A. EXAMPLE OF AVIATION LAW

How should admiralty law be incorporated into the law of outer space
rescues? To date, most space law has been made through the development
of international treaties. This pattern could be repeated with respect to
outer space rescues, by the promulgation of a Draft Outer Space Salvage
Convention.
The idea of incorporating admiralty law into a new field of law through the
drafting of treaties is, of course, not a new idea. The history of aviation law,
for example, is replete with examples of admiralty law being used as the
foundation for the early airspace treaties. The earliest instance of this
occurring is the Draft Convention on the Regime of Aerostats and Wireless
Telegraphy in 1906.109 That Convention recognized the existence of three
zones of air space: the first from 0-330 meters above the earth, the second
from 330-5000 meters, and the third above 5000 meters. The idea behind the
zones was that a state had a right to assert sovereignty over the airspace
immediately above its territory on land. In advancing justifications for these
zones, frequent allusions were made to the rights of states to assert control
over the waters immediately adjacent to their lands." 0
As the Second World War was coming to a close, it was recognized that
the post-war world would require a new regime for regulating civil aviation.
Accordingly, an international conference was held in 1944 in Chicago, the
result of which was the Convention on International Civil Aviation of
December 7, 1944. 1 At the conference the delegates made frequent refer-

109. A verbatim transcript of the summary minute of the rapporteur is contained in 21

293 (1907).
110. In attempting to decide on where the various zones would begin and end, for example,

ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DU DROIT INT'L

the delegates recalled the proposal of the Netherlands in 1895 that an international agreement
be reached which would set standard limits marking the dividing line between territorial waters
and open seas. Id. at 327.
111. 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. The history of the Chicago Convention is recalled in 2
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 599 (1967).
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ences to the freedom
of the seas in debating whether the skies should be
1 12

open or closed.
In more recent times, a number of treaties have been passed which make
it unlawful to hijack planes. 1 3 These treaties treat hijackers in the same
manner as prior admiralty law treated pirates who seized vessels. 114 Indeed,
hijackers are often referred to as air pirates.
B.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Of course, admiralty law could be incorporated into the law of outer space
rescues through court decisions. Again, aviation law provides examples of
this. In United States v. Cordova,11 5 a case decided in 1950 when the United
States did not yet have specific aviation laws, an attempt was made to use
admiralty law. Cordova arose out of events which occurred during a flight on

112. In particular, the Convention grappled with the question of whether or not there should
be restrictions placed on civil aviation competition. Lord Swinton of England argued for
regulation, so as to protect small nations, while Mr. Berle of the United States argued for open
skies and free competition. This debate was a modern version of the old controversy in which
Grotius argued for the freedom of the seas and Selden argued for closed seas. Id. The United
States lost its battle to keep the skies open to competition, as an elaborate pricing mechanism
was created under the auspices of the International Air Transport Association, a private
association of airlines. In the late 1970s, however, much of this cartel-like structure was
dismantled. See Klem & Lesiter, The Struggle for a Competitive Market Structure in InternationalA viation:the Benelux Protocols Take United States Policiesa Step Forward,11 L. & POL'Y
IN INT'L Bus. 557 (1979).
113. See the Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft), 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768,58 AM. J. INT'L L. 566 (1964), which
was signed in 1963 and has been ratified by over 100 states; the Hague Convention (Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft), 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 440 (1971), 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 133 (1971), approved of in 1970 and which also
has over 100 signatories; and the Montreal Convention, (Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation), T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 INT'L LEG. MAT.
1151 (1971), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 455 (1972). See generally Abramovsky, MultilateralConventions
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft, Part 1: The Hague
Convention, 13 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1974); MultilateralConventionsfor the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure and Interferencewith Aircraft, Part11: The Montreal Convention, 14 COL. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 268 (1975); and Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure and Interferencewith Aircraft, PartIII: The Legality and Feasabilityof a MultilateralAir
Security Enforcement Convention, 14 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1975).
114. As will be recalled, supra note 53, piracy makes the offender amenable to criminal
jurisdiction anywhere in the world because of the doctrine of universal interest. Article 7 of the
Hague Convention, supra note 113, uses the universal interest standard to require a state to
either prosecute the hijacker or extradite him to place which will try him:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does
not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its authority for the purpose of
prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of
any ordinary offense of a serious nature under the law of that State.
115. 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
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August 2, 1948 from San Juan to New York. During the flight Cordova and a
codefendant attacked, among others, the pilot and a stewardess. Because
there were no aviation laws prohibiting such attacks,1 16 the government
17
sought to use the special admiralty and maritime jurisdiction statutes,'
8
which prohibited such attacks."l Although the Court held that admiralty
law could not be used because an aircraft was not a "vessel," soon after the
decision Congress amended the special admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
so as to specifically include aircrafts. "9
VI. Conclusion

As this piece has shown, man's movement into space has begun in earnest.
Gone are the days when moon shots were something undertaken by national
governments for purposes of prestige and power. Instead, space is beginning
to become a place in which private parties seek to make fortunes, either with
other private parties or in cooperation with government. As the number of
spaceships, space stations and satellites increase, the potential for mishaps
will also increase. Some of these mishaps will require rescue operations, of
which at least a few will require quick action.
Many of these rescue operations will be conducted by private salvage
companies, 120 who will look to the bar to provide a legal regime regulating
space rescues. Such a regime already exists in the field of admiralty. As such,
admiralty lawyers and aerospace lawyers should combine their respective

116. Id. at 304.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 451 (1946), now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1982). The purpose of the
special admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is to fill the gap which would otherwise occur in the
criminal jurisdiction of the courts. Since, under the common law, the criminal jurisdiction of
courts is territorial, the jurisdiction of the admiralty over crimes which occur at sea is necessary
if there is to be a court which can try the defendant. Although such cases are therefore
technically admiralty cases, they are so in name only. In form and substance, they proceed just
like any other criminal case. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
118. The special admiralty and maritime jurisdiction statutes make it illegal to commit
felonious assaults, including murder, rape and assault. 18 U.S.C. § 455 (1946).
119. See 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (k) (1982).
120. It seems likely many space salvage companies will be privately operated. Not only does
the recent shift in NASA policy towards greater private sector funding and development in
space, supra note 64, encourage commercial salvage operations, but there are tremendous
profits to be realized from such salvage activities. Recall, for example, that the insurance
underwriters found it economically worthwhile to go forward with the salvaging of the Palapa
and Westar satellites even after NASA demanded that it be compensated for use of the Space
Shuttle. Supra notes 92-93. For a Moot Court problem involving a pirate space salvage
company (called Space Cabotage Navigation Co., Inc.), see Glazer, 1984 Spring Moot Court
Problem, 2 WHITE'S INN CHRON. 3. The problem is further discussed in In re White's Inn, 2
WHITE'S INN CHRON. 13, 16-18.
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talents to produce a comprehensive
body of space rescue law before any
t2
more time is allowed to pass. 1

121. It has been suggested that space salvage law could be developed either through the
drafting of an International Space Salvage Agreement modelled after the Brussels Convention
on Salvage at Sea, discussed supra note 99, or through national law and practice. See DeSaussure, supra note 39, at 102-103. The author of this Article believes that the better approach
would be the latter, for two reasons. First, international space agreements to date have required
years of work and have often been heavily influenced by extraneous political considerations.
Zieman, supra note 18, at 16, has noted that:
Global tensions of all sorts have made international law-making a farce, U.S. legal experts
maintain. Mideastern delegates, protesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon, paralyzed debate at
a 1982 U.N. satellite committee for weeks. Last year, U.S. representatives pulled out of a
space-law meeting in Vienna, protesting attacks by Eastern bloc countries on President
Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal. Neil Hosebal, NASA's general counsel, left his position on
the U.S. space committee in 1979 after urging President Carter not to sign the moon treaty he
himself helped negotiate. "I couldn't take it anymore," he says today.
The second problem with developing space law through international agreements is the low
number of countries who become parties to such treaties once they are promulgated. As has
been noted by Galloway, supra note 13, at 28:
The most essential task for the immediate future is to increase the number of States that are
Parties to the space treaties. Of the 47 nations represented on the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, only 14 have ratified or acceded to the four space treaties in force:
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom
and the United States. Thirteen of the COUPOS members have not ratified the 1967 Treaty
on Outer Space: Albania, Benin, Chad, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya,
Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines and Sudan. Twelve COUPOS members have not ratified the
Astronaut Agreement; twenty are not parties to the Liability Convention; and 31 have not
yet ratified the Registration Convention. By April, 1980, of the approximately 150 nations
[who were members of the United Nations General Assembly], the 1967 Treaty on Outer
Space had been ratified by only 76 countries; the 1968 Astronaut .Agreement by 71; the 1973
Liability Convention by 58, and the 1976 Registration Convention by 26. [footnote omitted]
See also Private Sector, supra note 58, at 177. Given these two facts-long lead times followed
by low ratifications-coupled with the likelihood that rescue missions may soon begin in
earnest, the prospect of having space salvage law developed through international treaty law is
unappealing. However, if a consensus emerges that certain features of maritime salvage law are
not appropriate in space, or if certain longstanding rules of maritime salvage law-such as
denying compensation for pure life salvage-are sought to be changed, then the holding of an
international convention to consider just those issues would be useful.
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